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ABSTRACT
The Partisan Politics that Led to the Spanish-American War
Donald E. Thompson, Jr.
This thesis explores how partisan politics played a major role in leading the United
States into the Spanish-American War. With the unprecedented economic depression
that began in 1893, many American politicians exploited a rebellion in Cuba to distract
Americans from their own financial problems. During the administration of Grover
Cleveland politicians from all political parties supported American intervention in Cuba
on behalf of the rebels. This show of support for the Cuban rebels by politicians was
designed to rally the American public around a common cause and highlight the
difference between them and the unpopular President Cleveland who opposed American
involvement in Spanish-Cuban affairs. After the election of William McKinley the
Cuban rebellion became a partisan issue. McKinley, who was also opposed to American
intervention in Cuba, persuaded his fellow Republican leaders to abandon their hostile
stance on Spain. Democrats and Populists, on the other hand, increased their support for
the Cuban rebels and used this as a political issue against McKinley and the
Republicans. Facing defeat in the upcoming election, Republicans gave in to the call for
war with Spain.
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INTRODUCTION

The Spanish-American War was a dramatic turning point in the history of the
United States. With a swift victory over Spain and the acquisition of an overseas
empire, America assumed the role of a leading world power. The possession of
territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific by the United States would drastically shape
the outcome of world events in the centuries to come. As Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
would proclaim a year after the cease fire, "The war of the United States with Spain was
very brief. Its results were many, startling, and of world-wide meaning."1 The United
States, like Great Britain, France and other European Nations had become an imperial
power. On the home front, the Spanish-American War united Americans around a
common enemy and helped heal wounds that had divided the country since the Civil
War.
As is the case in any complex series of events, the causes of this war were
numerous and inextricably intertwined. Historians have spent more than a hundred
years now sorting through the evidence in search of the reasons. Traditional
explanations for the war have focused on Spanish atrocities perpetrated on the Cubans,
the explosion onboard the battleship Maine and “Yellow Journalism” inciting the
American public. Recent emphasis has been placed on America’s imperial ambitions,
economic interests, gender and cultural reasons.2 Undeniably, all of these are major
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factors to consider in any study of the Spanish-American War. However, regardless of
precipitating events, the government of the United States was ultimately responsible for
the decision to take the country to war. The role that partisan politics played in this
decision is usually overlooked. As historian Ernest May wrote, “In no major episode of
American history has so little been attributed to the intentions of political leaders and so
much to forces beyond their control.”3
This study seeks to reveal the importance of partisan politics in leading the
United States into a war with Spain. The thesis of this paper is that American
congressmen exploited a foreign crisis in Cuba for their own political advantage. Faced
with a devastating depression that was sweeping the nation, congressmen used a
rebellion in Cuba to distract Americans from their own economic difficulties. At first,
congressmen from all political parties took up the cause of Cuban rebels to garner public
support and to highlight their differences with an unpopular Democratic President
Grover Cleveland who opposed American interference in Cuban-Spanish affairs. Only
after the election of Republican President William McKinley in 1896 did the Cuban
rebellion become a politically partisan issue. Like Cleveland, McKinley was adamantly
against involving the United States in the intrigues of Cuban affairs. McKinley opposed
U.S. involvement in a war that would cost American lives, disrupt international trade
and frighten the stock market. He was able to persuade Republicans in Congress to
abandon their hostile stance on Spain. Congressional Democrats and Populists, on the
other hand, sensed the growing public support for American intervention and were
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determined to parlay their support for the Cuban rebels into victory in the upcoming
election. Faced with potential political losses, most Republicans gave in to the demand
for war and pressured McKinley to intervene in Cuba. McKinley, who had tried every
means to negotiate a peaceful settlement that would bring prosperity and stability to
Cuba, finally succumbed to the political pressure and declared war on Spain. In doing
so, McKinley believed that he could unite the political parties behind a common cause.
But this was not to be the case; as war with Spain began, political partisanship continued
unabated.

3

Chapter One
American-Spanish-Cuban Relations: A Context

Tensions had simmered between Spain and the United States over Cuba for
decades. The proximity of Cuba to the states, merely ninety miles off the coast of
Florida, made the island a political chess piece almost from the beginning. Thomas
Jefferson considered annexing Cuba as early as 1808. In a letter to President Madison
the following year, Jefferson made it clear that acquiring the “Pearl of the Antilles” was
on the distant horizon but took no steps toward formal annexation.1 A common
presumption among leaders of the time was that an expanding United States would
inevitably pull Cuba into its orbit. John Quincy Adams expounded this theory by
predicting that Cuba, “like an apple severed by the tempest from its native tree would
gravitate only toward the North American Union.”2 If Adam’s words insinuated a desire
for a peaceful union between Cuba and the United States, other American leaders called
for a shotgun wedding. General Andrew Jackson, facing the Spanish on the Florida
frontier, declared that if Congress would give him the go ahead and the equipment,
“Florida shall be in possession of the United States in three months…Cuba in six.”3
Although Jackson received little additional help by way of Congress, his army’s
repeated excursions into Florida in pursuit of hostile Indians and runaway slaves finally
forced Spain to the negotiating table.4 The resulting treaty, drawn up by President James
1
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Monroe’s Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, required Spain to relinquish Florida
to the United States and abandon their claim to the Oregon Territory. In return, the
United States agreed to pay a monetary settlement and promised to respect the integrity
of Spain’s other territories: any plans to wrest Cuba away from Spain were put on hold.5
Spain had surrendered a large chunk of land in North America but in doing so had
prevented further encroachment by the United States. With their vulnerable northern
flank secure, Spain was able to pour its resources into suppressing the ongoing
rebellions in its other Spanish American colonies.
The United States, meanwhile, shifted its attention to fulfilling its “Manifest
Destiny” by conquering and settling the vast western region of America. The dream of a
coast to coast nation had existed since the days of the Founding Fathers and was no
doubt shared by the majority of Americans. The process whereby America would fulfill
this dream of expansion however, was a contentious point of debate. Leaders such as
Jefferson and Adams envisioned a westward expansion that would peacefully extend
civilization and prosperity to those who were willing to accept a superior way of life.
As Secretary of State, Adams openly criticized the idea of the United States government
using force to take territory. On July 4, 1821, Adams addressed Congress to outline his
vision for America; “[America] goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy...The
fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force… She
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might become the dictatress of the world: she would be no longer the ruler of her own
spirit.”6
Others American leaders, however, such as Jackson and his protégé James K.
Polk, disagreed with Adams and saw American expansion more as a crusade. In this
vision, the “Anglo-Saxon” citizens of the United States were destined to sweep aside the
Native Americans and other lesser races, by force if necessary, to make way for what
they viewed as their dominant culture.7 By mid nineteenth century the differences in
these two visions would collide in the debate leading up to the Mexican-American War.
Jackson’s Democratic Party, led by President Polk, favored forcefully taking Mexican
territory while the majority of the Whig Party considered such an act unconstitutional,
unnecessary and immoral. In the end, the Democrats won the debate and the United
States won the war; adding more than 500,000 square miles of territory to the nation.8
With the westward push to the Pacific nearing completion, the United States
once again looked south to Cuba. During the election of 1848, Democratic presidential
candidate Lewis Cass made it known that if elected he would move to annex Cuba. The
Democratic Party, which was becoming an ever more Southern sectional party, saw
Cuba as a potential slave state that offered economical opportunities as well as free
labor. No less important, adding Cuba to the slave-holding South would help swing the
balance of power in Congress to their side. Northern Whig leaders understood the
stakes well and decided to nominate an anti-expansionist and popular Mexican6

John Quincy Adams., Address to Congress on the Fourth of July. (University of Missouri Digital
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7
Amy S. Greenberg., Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire. (New York, NY.:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 21.
8
Joseph Wheelan., Invading Mexico: America’s Continental Dream and the Mexican War, 18461848. (New York, N.Y.: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2007), 96-98, 404.

6

American War hero; Zachary Taylor. This old general from Virginia opposed the
annexation of Cuba as well as the extension of slavery into the western territories but
was able to skirt these issues during the campaign and thus win the presidency.9 In
Taylor’s inaugural address he ignored the slavery issue altogether but made it clear that
his administration would not engage in any forceful territorial expansion. He anchored
his position by quoting from Washington’s venerated farewell address which warned of
entangling alliances with foreign nations and further declared that Christianity directed
the United States to the “cultivation of peaceful and friendly relationships with all other
powers.”10
Undeterred by Washington’s isolationist principles or religious constraints, some
in the United States decided they would conquer foreign lands with or without the
government’s permission. Adventurers and soldiers of fortune organized private armies,
outfitted seagoing vessels and plotted the hostile takeover of Cuba and other territories.
These filibustering expeditions were frequently romanticized in American newspapers
as benevolent acts of “liberation” and were bankrolled by private donations obtained
through lobbying and rallies. Many political leaders also lent their support, both tacitly
and openly. One of the more noteworthy series of filibustering expeditions was lead by
Venezuelan native and former Cuban resident: Narciso López. Claiming to have the
support of the Cuban people, López was able to recruit between 450 and 600 paid
soldiers (mostly American men from the Southern states) and position them on Round
Island off the coast of Mississippi in preparation for invading Cuba. President Taylor

9
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received information about the impending expedition and ordered a naval blockade of
the small island. Surrounded by the US Navy, López was forced to suspend his planned
invasion of Cuba. However, López saw this defeat as only a temporary setback and
within a year he would make another failed attempt to take over Cuba. Finally in
August of 1851 López would make his third and last attempt on Cuba. Within two days
of landing, López and his army was defeated by a combined force of Spanish regulars
and armed Cuban citizens. Captured survivors, including López, were lined up in a
Havana square and executed.11
The López incident and other armed forays into Cuba that originated from the
United States (even though not sanctioned by the United States’ government) took a
huge toll on Spanish-American relations. For years, Spain had watched with alarm as
more and more Americans, including political leaders, called for intervention in Cuba.
Filibustering in Cuba was seen as additional proof that Americans were becoming
increasingly audacious in their desire to deprive Spain of its last vestiges of empire in
the New World. Spanish suspicion that the American government was complicit in
these armed incursions seemed to be confirmed with the 1852 election of Democrat
Franklin Pierce as president. Pierce, who was an ardent supporter of extending slavery
in the western territories and beyond, did not try to hide his intention of annexing new
lands. In his inaugural address he laid out his policy of expansion:

With an experience thus suggestive and cheering, the policy of my Administration
will not be controlled by any timid forebodings of evil expansion. Indeed, it is not
to be disguised that our attitude as a nation and our position on the globe render
the acquisition of certain possessions not within our jurisdiction eminently
11

Amy S. Greenberg., Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire. (New York, NY.:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 181-183.

8

important for our protection, if not in the future essential for the preservation of
the rights of commerce and the peace of the world.12

Pierce’s explicit announcement of an aggressive expansion program offended the
sensibilities of those Americans who still considered the United States to be a “shinning
beacon” of freedom to the rest of the world. Forcefully taking land from weaker nations
was considered by many to be the ignoble occupation of European colonizers or Oriental
despots: the United States was founded on higher moral principles. Nonetheless, within
a year of taking office, the Pierce administration had persuaded Mexico, by threat of
force, to sell the United States another significant portion of its northern territory. Called
the “Gadsden Purchase” after the American ambassador to Mexico, James Gadsden,
who negotiated the treaty, this treaty added an additional 45,535 square miles to the
American southwest.13
Buttressed by this diplomatic victory, President Pierce would next turn his
attention to an international dilemma that was brewing in Cuba. In February of 1854,
Spanish authorities seized a United States’ merchant ship Black Warrior in Havana
harbor for failure to provide the proper shipping documentation. Painted as a brazen act
of Spanish thievery by American newspapers, the ship’s confiscation touched off a
public clamor for war with Spain.14 President Pierce quickly sent word to his American
minister at Madrid, Pierre Soule, to deliver the Spanish an explicit ultimatum- Spain had
forty-eight hours to pay an indemnity of three hundred thousand dollars.15
12

Franklin Nichols., Franklin Pierce: Young Hickory of the Granite Hills. (Philadelphia, PA.:
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At the brink of war, Secretary of State William Marcy stepped in and offered the
Spanish more moderate demands that opened the way for negotiations.16 Spain was
notorious for “foot-dragging” in any diplomatic bartering with the United States and this
time would be no exception. An impatient Pierce soon grew frustrated with what he
perceived as stalling by Spain and decided to use the same strong-arm tactics that had
succeeded in Mexico. He directed Minister Soule to confer with the American Ministers
to France and England in order to devise a plan to take Cuba from Spain. This plan,
which would be called the “Ostend Manifesto” after the town in Belgium where the
three ministers wrote it, declared; “Cuba is as necessary to the North American republic
as any of its present members.” Furthermore, the ministers recommended offering Spain
one hundred and twenty million dollars for the island. If this offer were rejected then
the United States would be “justified” in taking Cuba by force.17
Although this document was sent to the State Department as a confidential
dispatch, word of its content was soon leaked to American newspapers. A fickle
American public that had condoned or tolerated annexing Mexican territory months
earlier in the Gadsden Purchase reacted differently to this blatant land grab in the
Caribbean. Many Americans, especially anti-slavery Northerners, denounced this plan as
a government-sanctioned act of piracy. Bending to the public backlash, President Pierce
disavowed the document and accepted Minister Soule’s resignation.18 Pierce’s dream of
extending the American empire beyond the shoreline had been strangled in its cradle.
Even so, one of the Ostend Manifesto’s authors, former minister to England, James

16
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Buchanan, would be elected the next president. Like Pierce, Buchanan was a proexpansionist; but tensions between the North and South over the slavery issue would
eclipse all international concerns during his term in office. Before Buchanan was out of
office seven Southern states would secede from the union and the incoming (and first)
Republican President, Abraham Lincoln, would confront a bloody civil war that
threatened the existence of the United States.
With the United States occupied with a civil war, Spain took the opportunity to
send its military to the Caribbean once again to re-occupy the island nation of Santo
Domingo. Pedro Santana, the Dominican president, had requested Spanish intervention
but the citizens of the island soon rebelled and within two years the Spanish were forced
to annul the annexation. Although the rebellion succeeded in permanently expelling
Spain from Santo Domingo, the financial costs of waging war bankrupted the small
nation’s weak economy. In 1869, drowning in debt, the new government of Santo
Domingo decided to negotiate a treaty for the annexation of their country to the United
States for one and a half million dollars. The current President of the United States,
Ulysses S. Grant, was dealing with the aftermath of his own war yet nevertheless was
enthusiastic about the prospect of buying a foothold in the Caribbean. The Congress,
however, was less excited about obtaining a troubled island nation that presented all
sorts of potential problems. After a lengthy consideration in the Senate the treaty was
ten votes short of ratification.19
This debate over annexing Santo Domingo foreshadowed the anti-imperialism
arguments that would be heard in the wake of the Spanish-American war. Those

19
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Republicans who opposed the treaty argued that it was unconstitutional to annex nonadjacent mainland territory. Republicans, such as the reformer, Carl Schurz, also argued
that the non-white peoples of the Caribbean were unfit for a democratic government and
would become a burden on the country. Democrats, who held only twelve seats in the
Senate, also argued against the treaty on racial grounds: Santo Domingo would become
a “black state” whose citizens would gain voting rights and a free pass to migrate to the
continental United States.20 Besides the race issue, Democrats were also wary of any
foreign adventure or territorial conquest that might potentially strengthen the federal
government or increase the import of agricultural products that could compete with their
own local produce.21 This, of course, was a complete reversal of their antebellum
support for conquering new territory.
Spain had likewise opposed the treaty that would have given its former colony to
the United States. Among many reasons, Spain feared the United States would be
tempted to annex Cuba next. Unrest on Cuba had indeed escalated into open warfare by
1868 and the American public was watching closely as the war unfolded. President
Ulysses S. Grant’s administration did not support either side in the conflict but many
private filibuster expeditions launched from the United States began shipping arms and
other supplies to the Cuban rebels. As before, these filibusters were often given a wink
and a nod by local officials and celebrated in newspapers.22

20
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On October 31, 1873 a Cuban gunrunning boat named the Virginius, captained
by a former American naval officer Joseph Fry and falsely flying a United States flag,
was captured by the Spanish off the coast of Jamaica. The ship’s contents of arms and
ammunition were confiscated and the captain and crew were taken back to Cuba for
trial. Despite an outcry of international condemnation, Fry and fifty three of his men
and passengers were found guilty of piracy and executed.23 American newspapers
reported that several of the sailors were decapitated and their heads placed on pikes and
marched through the streets. An outraged American public once again called for
military action against Spain.24
President Grant responded with sympathy for the executed Americans but was
not prepared to take military action against Spain. The United States army was still
overseeing reconstruction in the South and was ill-prepared to begin a foreign conflict
over dubious reasons.25 Besides, President Grant was also coping with a deep economic
depression in the United States and was reluctant to add to the mounting national debt.
Spain also signaled a willingness to make amends for the Virginius incident and began
working out an agreement with Secretary of State Hamilton Fish to pay an indemnity to
the families of the executed sailors. In addition, the Spanish government agreed to
surrender the Virginius and the surviving crew and passengers to an American warship
and salute the American flag. During the negotiations Grant also offered to purchase the

23
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troubled island from Spain.26 The offer was rejected by Spanish officials and
afterwards, Secretary Fish maneuvered to stall any further attempts by the government
to annex Cuba.27 Fish’s opposition to making Cuba a state mirrored the racial
arguments heard in the debates over acquiring Santo Domingo.28
While American and Spanish leaders debated the fate of Cuba, the rebels
continued their war for independence. For ten years the rebels struggled persistently yet
unsuccessfully against a superior Spanish army. The rebellion finally ended in 1878
after Spain promised a series of limited political reforms. Negotiating out of necessity
and with limited help from abroad, the beleaguered rebels accepted the Spanish terms.
Unfortunately, the promised reforms never fully materialized and life improved little for
the inhabitants of the island.
Dismayed at the lack of reforms, thousands of these war-weary Cubans made
their way to the United States and began rebuilding their lives. Many still harbored the
dream of an independent homeland but understood the need to have American support in
any future attempt at revolution. Cuban expatriate leaders, many whom were veterans
of the late war, began working within the Cuban communities across America to enlist
members and collect funds and supplies for a second revolution. These revolutionary
leaders also created a lobbyist organization, known as the “Cuban Junta” that worked to
gain support from American politicians, newspapers and the public for liberating

26
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Cuba.29 Even though the Junta was partially successful in this effort, the American
government was not yet ready to take up the cause of “Cuba Libre.” Cubans would have
to wait until the end of the nineteenth century before the foreign policy of the United
States would shift in their favor.

29
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Chapter Two
Cuba and the Cleveland Administration

During the 1890s American foreign policy would transition from a
Western-hemisphere focused policy and restrained post-bellum attitude to a more
aggressive global strategy. Prompting this policy shift were the rapidly changing
economical realities of the late nineteenth century. The United States had
emerged during this period as one of the world’s leading industrial nation and
foreign markets were becoming increasingly important for continued growth.1 In
order to open up these new markets for trade the United States had to reach out
and engage the world as never before. This unprecedented assertion into global
affairs would present many new challenges to American leaders and breathe new
life into the perennial debate over territorial expansion.
Many, if not most, of America’s leaders at this time favored a foreign
policy that promoted a “commercial expansion” whereby the United States would
access global markets through such benign methods as reciprocal trade
agreements and leasing foreign coaling stations.2 A new generation of leaders,
however, believed that the United States’ new position as a world power required
a more aggressive policy toward its global neighbors. These leaders, such as
Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, were part of an imperialist
movement that called for the United States to abandon its restrained foreign
1

H.W. Brands, The Reckless Decade: America in the 1890s (Chicago, Il.:The University of
Chicago Press, Ltd., 1995), 39.
2
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policy and compete with the European powers in territorial conquests.3 Evidence
that this movement was gaining influence came in January of 1893 when a group
of American and European citizens, with the help of U.S. Marines, overthrew the
queen of Hawaii and established a provisional government on the Central Pacific
islands. Afterwards they began negotiations to be annexed to the United States.4
President Benjamin Harrison accepted the request but his term in office expired
before he could push the treaty through Congress. The incoming Democratic
President, Grover Cleveland immediately withdrew the treaty after taking office.5
President Cleveland had defeated Harrison in the election of 1892 mainly
by promising lower tariffs and other governmental reforms but was also
notoriously opposed to territorial expansion or any semblance of imperialism.
Cleveland was determined to maintain a cautious and conservative foreign policy
much like Washington had envisioned in his celebrated farewell address.
However, soon after Cleveland took office an economic crisis overshadowed all
international concerns. This financial disaster, later called the “Panic of 1893,”
would develop into the worst economic depression in the country’s history to that
point.
Historians and economists offer many different theories on what exactly
caused the depression but most agree that the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of
1890 greatly exacerbated the problem. This act, designed to support Western
silver mining interests, mandated the U.S. Treasury buy a certain amount of silver
each month with bank notes that could be redeemed for either silver or gold.
3
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During the panic numerous investors rushed to cash in their silver notes for gold,
thus depleting the federal gold reserves. Cleveland had strongly opposed the
Sherman Silver Purchase Act even before it was enacted but was nonetheless
blamed for the resulting economic storm.6 Reacting promptly, Cleveland called
for an emergency congressional session to repel the act. The measure passed but
the economic freefall continued.
In the wake of the Panic of 1893 thousands of companies across America
went out of business, farmers were devastated by falling crop prices, numerous
railroads went bankrupt, and more than six hundred banks closed.7 The
unemployment rate soared to between twelve and eighteen percent and many
workers who remained employed saw their wages cut drastically.8 Production of
bituminous coal almost completely halted when one hundred and eighty thousand
miners went on strike.9 This unprecedented instability in American society caused
public confusion and disillusionment in national leaders.
The nation appeared to be on the verge of an open insurrection by March of
1894 when a populist leader, Jacob S. Coxey, organized hundreds of unemployed
workers from Ohio and Pennsylvania into an “army” and set out on a peaceful
march to Washington D.C. to demand federal relief. Passing through towns on its
way east, Coxey’s army was met by thousands of cheering well wishers who lined

6
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the streets to witness the spectacle.10 Following in Coxey’s footsteps, thousands
of more citizens from around the country formed into their own battalions to
advance on the capital. This mass movement turned into chaos as several of these
Coxey-type armies seized freight trains and rioted in the streets.11
Newspapers generally downplayed the seriousness of these armies,
portraying the marchers as bands of tramps and cranks more concerned with
begging for hand-outs than fomenting a revolution. Some in the press, however,
saw the Coxey movement as symptomatic of a growing problem. The Economist
newspaper reported that “The greatest industrial struggle ever begun in this
country, if not in the world, is in progress here.”12 The London Chronicle
similarly predicted that “coxeyism” would eventually escalate into a full blown
civil war that would be “almost as serious as that which arose from slavery.”13
Meeting these challenges vigorously, the Cleveland Administration
dispatched federal troops to no less than fourteen states to assist local authorities
in confronting the marchers. In the capital, the War Department delivered
hundreds of small arms and repeating rifles to the Treasury Department in
anticipation of Coxey’s arrival. The local police force also beefed up their patrols
and began arresting suspicious-looking strangers.14 Members of Congress were
divided over how to respond to the approaching armies. Many congressmen,
especially from the Western states, expressed support for these unemployed
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workers whom they believed had full entitlement to stage peaceful
demonstrations. Other congressmen predicted the Coxey movement was destined
to descend into chaos and widespread bloodshed. Nevada Republican William M.
Stewart wrote to Coxey to implore him to suspend his march and instead express
his grievances with a ballot in the upcoming November election. Stewart
cautioned Coxey that marching on Washington would only give President
Cleveland a pretext to strengthen the federal government and suppress other
oppositional voices.15
Undeterred by any warnings, Coxey and his army finally arrived in
Washington D.C. on May 1st 1894. Forming a flamboyant parade, complete with
banners and a brass band, Coxey’s followers marched down Pennsylvania Avenue
to the capitol building. As thousands of spectators crowded to witness the scene,
Coxey was arrested and hustled off without much resistance. The rest of his
followers were likewise arrested or dispersed by club-wielding policemen.16 The
other industrial armies around the country met similar fates as federal troops
apprehended their leaders and forced the demonstrators to disband.
Less than two weeks after Coxey’s arrest, three thousand workers at the
Pullman Palace Car Company in Illinois went on strike.17 The American Railway
Union, lead by Eugene V. Debs, supported the strike and organized a nation-wide
boycott of trains hauling Pullman cars and effectively closed down all traffic
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west of Chicago.18 President Cleveland once again reacted forcefully by ordering
Federal Marshals and some twelve thousand United States Army troops to break
up the strikes and restore service to the railroads. These heavy-handed tactics of
Cleveland caused an outrage among much of the American public. Politically
savvy Republicans, Populists and Democrats denounced these drastic measures
and scrambled to distance themselves from the President. 19
Unfortunately for the Democrats, the public’s anger at Cleveland and the
continued economic crisis manifested itself in the off-year election of 1894 as
voters turned strongly against them. Suffering the worst defeat in their history,
the Democratic Party lost every congressional race outside the South. Prior to this
election, the Democrats had enjoyed a majority in the House and Senate, now
they had lost both. In the House alone they gave up one hundred and twenty-five
seats and were now the minority with only ninety three members as opposed to
two hundred and fifty-four Republicans.20 Faced with these unprecedented
electoral losses, the Democratic Party struggled to maintain itself as a viable
political force. Experienced Democratic politicians understood that if the party
were to succeed in the future it needed to focus on popular issues that would
attract former Democratic voters back into the fold. One issue that had
historically proven successful in rallying the public behind their leaders and
distracting them from domestic problems was a foreign crisis. Evidence that
some political strategists were weighing the benefits of a foreign crisis can be
found in the words of one prominent Democrat, Fitzhugh Lee, who advised
18
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Cleveland; “(war) might do much toward directing the minds of the people away
from imaginary ills.”21 Nonetheless, Cleveland stubbornly refused to fall prey to
the siren song of jingoism.
However, the opportunity for Congress to exploit an international crisis would
come in early 1895 when war once again broke out in Cuba. This renewed war for
independence, like the Democrat’s political headaches, stemmed from the financial
meltdown in the United States. Thousands of Cuban émigrés in New York and Florida
had lost their jobs after the Panic of 1893 and these idle workers were recruited by the
Cuban Junta to form a new revolutionary army and return to their homeland. Also, the
American depression had severely inflicted the Cuban economy and poverty-stricken
citizens on the island were ready for a revolution. The first battle of the “Cuban War for
Independence” occurred in February 24, 1895 when a small band of Cuban rebels
attacked a detachment of Spanish soldiers in the village of Baire, Cuba. This minor
skirmish in the Cuban jungle was a military defeat for the out-gunned rebels but it
succeeded in arousing the excitement of politicians in Washington, D.C.
The next day, members of the United States’ Senate offered their support for
Cuban liberation and Florida Democratic Senator Wilkinson Call submitted a resolution
demanding the Spanish government release a captured rebel, Antonio Maximo Mora,
who held American as well as Cuban citizenship.22 In an age when international
communication systems were relatively limited and erratic, it is remarkable that details
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of this first battle, in a small Cuban village, could reach Washington D.C. so quickly.23
The prompt transmission of this information can be credited to the efficiency of the
Cuban Junta which was working closely with some members of Congress. Senator Call,
who had submitted this first resolution, had especially close ties with the Junta. His
state of Florida was home to many Cuban-Americans and his son was employed by the
Junta to raise funds for their cause.24
Later that week, as hostilities on the island increased, the Senate discussed
Spanish brutalities against innocent civilians and submitted legislation to the Committee
on Foreign Relations that condemned Spanish authorities for imprisoning two more
Cuban citizens holding American passports.25 The following month another incident
occurred in Cuban waters that electrified members of Congress. The Spanish navy, on
patrol for gunrunners, fired a warning shot over the bow of an American mail ship, the
Alliança, that was steaming off the eastern coast of Cuba.26 Infuriated congressmen
took the podium once again to rebuke the “treacherous Spaniards” for this attack on
innocent Americans. Democrat Senator from Alabama, John T. Morgan demanded
President Cleveland to “…dispatch a fleet of warships to Havana.” Continuing the war
cry, Republican Shelby Cullom of Illinois angrily proclaimed “it is time someone woke
up and realized the necessity of annexing more property.” The New York Tribune
reported the next day “The outrage (by Senators) would not have been more flagrant if
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they (the Spanish) had entered the harbor of New York and bombarded the City Hall.” 27
Indeed, this early saber-rattling by members of both major parties in the United States
was an overreaction but would be characteristic of the dialogue in Congress for the next
several years.
Contrary to the stir in Congress, the major newspapers in America gave little
attention to this new outbreak of rebellion in Cuba. The New York Times reported on
page five that a revolution in Cuba was a “matter of fiction,” and that the incident in the
village of Baire was nothing more than “rioters” who wished to complain to the local
governor.28 Other media outlets depicted the rebellion as just another in a long line of
periodic revolts.29 This disputes the myth that aggressive congressmen were only
reacting to pressure from sensationalist newspapers’ accounts of the Spanish atrocities in
Cuba. An explanation that is now routinely offered by historians is that competition
between newspapers, William Randolph Hearst’s Journal and Joseph Pulitzer’ World in
particular, caused the Spanish-American war. Often quoted is Hearst’s telegraph to
Cuban correspondent Frederic Remington; “You furnish the pictures and I’ll furnish the
war.”30 The fact is- Hearst did not begin publishing the Journal until seven months after
the rebellion began. Likewise, Pulitzer’s World did not print its first insurgentsympathetic editorial until nearly a month after the first anti-Spanish discourse in
Congress. In this era, the majority of newspapers in the United States were mouthpieces
for one political party or another. These papers were no exception. Pulitzer and Hearst
27

Walter Karp, The Politics of War (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1979), 41-42.
“Cuba’s Alleged Revolution,” New York Times, 27 February 1895, p. 5., “Cuban Rebels
Penitent,” New York Times, 28 February 1895, p.5.
29
Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the
Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press,
1998), 2.
30
Donald H. Dyal, Historical Dictionary of the Spanish American War (Westport, CT.:
Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 1996), 157.
28

24

were both well-known supporters of Democratic causes. Hearst was the son a
Democratic Congressman and would later parlay his fame as a newspaper editor into his
own political career.31 It is certain, however, that horrific accounts of atrocities in Cuba
contributed to an increase in newspaper sales, but many of these headlines were
provided by the politicians themselves.
In the weeks after the Alliança affair, Congressmen continued to speak out in
condemnation of Spain. In several states, Congressmen organized mass rallies and
patriotic fundraisers in honor of the Cuban rebels.32 President Cleveland, who was a
stubborn enemy of jingoism, watched the antics of these leaders with growing alarm.33
In a stern address to Congress, the President stressed the obligation of the United States
government to recognize Spanish sovereignty in Cuba and condemned filibustering
expeditions originating from the United States.34 In regards to the Alliança incident,
Cleveland made it clear that he intended to give the Spanish government sufficient time
to apologize and did not want to provoke them unnecessarily.35 To Spain, Cleveland sent
word via Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham to demand of the government “…a
prompt disavowal of the unauthorized act and due expression of regret” and warned that
future interference with American shipping would not be tolerated.36
As Cleveland waited for his demands to be met, another Latin American crisis
took center stage in America. This dispute concerned the border region between
31
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Venezuela and British Guyana in South America. The disagreement stemmed from the
discovery of gold in this area (and control of the Orinoco River, gateway to South
America) and leaders of both countries claimed to own the territory. Worried that the
superior British military was poised to seize the land, Venezuela petitioned the United
States for assistance on the grounds that this was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.
Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Relations, P. Ezequiel Rojas sent word to Secretary of
State Walter Gresham that his country regarded the United States as “a nation that is
called upon to watch over the political and territorial integrity of the other American
peoples.”37 This Venezuelan recognition of the Monroe Doctrine was considered by
many as further evidence of American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. In a
widely-read article, Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts
condemned the “territorial aggression” of the British and reminded the government of its
responsibility to prevent European imperialism in Latin America.38
Members of Congress salivated over this opportunity to stir up Americans’ latent
animosity toward its old nemesis; Great Britain. The well-regarded North American
Review reported that Democrats had been eager to use the Venezuelan border dispute as
a “new plank for their national platform” and the Republican Party likewise “derived its
fair share of public approbation from the incident.”39 Texas Democratic Congressman
Thomas Paschal was even more candid in his appraisal of the possible political benefits
of this crisis; “Turn this Venezuelan question up or down, North, South, East or West,
37
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and it’s a winner,” he confessed to the newly-appointed Secretary of State, Richard
Olney.40 Continuing, Paschal compared anarchists, socialists and populists to an
outbreak of boils on the “political surface” of America and exclaimed “One cannon shot
across the bow of a British boat in defense of this principle [the Monroe Doctrine] will
knock more pus out of it than would suffice to inoculate and corrupt our people for the
next two years.”41 In another letter to Olney, George P. Ikirt, the campaign manager of
the Ohio Democratic gubernatorial nominee, pleaded for “a little jingo” against Great
Britain to help turn out the vote for his candidate in the upcoming election.42
To the surprise of many, President Cleveland agreed to confront Great Britain.
Without consulting Venezuela, Cleveland directed Secretary of State Olney to send a
strongly-worded message to the British demanding they submit to American arbitration.
When the British initially refused to comply, Cleveland asked Congress for
authorization to appoint a boundary commission and proposed that the commission’s
findings be enforced "by every means." This thinly-veiled threat of war against one of
the greatest military superpowers in the world quickly became the hot topic of national
and international newspapers.43 Congress unanimously passed the measure and Olney
sent another letter to the British reiterating America’s firm stance.44 British leaders
cautiously studied their options and decided against creating another enemy at this
precarious juncture. Faced with numerous difficulties in managing their global empire
40
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and the growing threat from Germany, Britain reluctantly accepted American arbitration
in the border dispute and tensions eased.45
President Cleveland had temporarily won the approval of the American public
and politicians. Letters filled with congratulation and patriotic passion flooded the
Executive Mansion. Theodore Roosevelt, currently serving as President of the New
York City Police Commissioners, wrote Cleveland to thank him “with all my heart as an
American,” for his success in Venezuela.46 Some historians, such as Walter Karp,
believe this episode in foreign diplomacy proved Cleveland had succumbed to political
pressures and was trying to garner the people’s support by taking a firm position against
the British.47 Yet, a close study of Cleveland’s prior opposition to any form of
imperialism, demonstrates this stance on the Venezuelan border issue followed
precedent. For Cleveland, the British threat of taking Venezuelan land by force did
indeed represent a violation of the Monroe Doctrine; to ignore this affront would be a
sign of American weakness. Cleveland was also well aware that European countries had
recently contemplated expanding their imperial empires into Latin America.48 In his
Annual Address, Cleveland pointed out past incursions by European powers into Latin
America and suggested that the threat of additional territorial expansion was becoming
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ever more tempting to imperialist nations.49 This strong stance against British
aggression in Venezuela would be a powerful warning to all the European powers.
Regardless of Cleveland’s motivation, many members of Congress interpreted
this diplomatic victory as proof that America had entered the pantheon of great nations.
Reveling in its success, Congress reconvened in December with a renewed confidence in
the United States’ ability to facilitate Cuban independence. Several resolutions
addressing the Cuban question were submitted to the House Foreign Affairs and the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee for consideration. The first to make it to the full
Senate on January 28, 1896 was a resolution by Democrat Senator John T. Morgan that
granted belligerent rights to the Cuban insurgents. The second resolution to be debated,
offered by Republican Senator Don Cameron, requested the President to work with
Spain “…for the recognition of the independence of Cuba.”50 Both of these measures,
which were later combined as the Morgan-Cameron resolution, were concurrent or
“non-binding” and required no executive action.
Amid the deliberation on these resolutions, a series of events in Cuba intensified
the debate. First, the infamous Captain-General Valeriano Weyler replaced the
ineffective Spanish head of the military forces in Cuba, General Arsenio Martínez
Campos. Already well known in the United States for his brutal military tactics during
the Ten Year War, Weyler was given full power by the Spanish government to take
whatever drastic measures were necessary to quash the rebellion.51 Weyler, dubbed “The
Butcher,” and the “modern imitator of Cortez” by newspaper reporters, would soon live
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up to his nickname. He began a program of forced concentration (called
“reconcentrado” by insurgents and the American press) whereby four hundred thousand
men, women and children would eventually be herded together into camps lacking
proper sanitation and provisions. Consequently, thousands of Cuban civilians began
dying of starvation and disease.52
After word of Weyler’s arrival reached Washington, congressional debate on the
Morgan-Cameron Resolution focused on the brutality of the Spanish military and the
need to protect American citizens and property in Cuba. Displaying patriotic fervor,
proponents of the resolution argued for the use of the American military to end these
atrocities in Cuba and force Spain out of the Western Hemisphere. One exceptional
exhibition of political theater by Democrat Senator, Roger Q. Mills of Texas, was
featured in the next edition of the New York Times. The heading for the story was “Mills
Shouts For War: The Excited Texan Calls For Armed Intervention In Cuba.” The story
in part read; “Mr. Mills grabbed a sword… and began to strike down on the oppressors
of Cuba regardless of consequences to himself, without pity for his neighboring
Senators… Not since the jingoes made their first imperious onset for war with Spain to
secure the freedom of Cuba has the Senate witnessed another savage attack like Mills’
upon Spain.”53
Opposition to the Morgan-Cameron Resolution, led by Republican Senators George
Frisbie Hoar of Massachusetts and Eugene Pryor Hale of Maine, accused supporters of
the bill of engineering a foreign crisis for political gains. In one particularly heated
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exchange in March, Senator Hale accused Ohio Republican John Sherman of using false
and inflammatory accounts of the Cuban war to build himself up for a presidential bid.54
Hale also condemned the Cubans for their unscrupulous methods in warfare and for
wantonly destroying American property on the island. Other arguments against a more
aggressive stance on Cuba questioned the constitutionality of congressional recognition
of belligerency rights and pointed out that the resolution was non-binding and therefore
meaningless. 55
Despite the opposition, the Morgan-Cameron Resolution passed both the House
and Senate with bi-partisan support. The Senate vote was 64 to six with 10 abstentions,
while the House vote was 247 to 27 with 80 abstentions.56 The overwhelming support
of this legislation was significant in that it legitimized in the minds of the public, the
right of America to intervene in Cuba if necessary. But, considering these resolutions
were non-binding, they were more posturing than an effective plan to solve the problem.
Both houses of Congress knew it was unlikely President Cleveland would follow the
recommendation of these resolutions. Cleveland had already made it known he believed
in Spanish sovereignty in Cuba. In an election year, however, supporting anti-Spanish
resolutions became an effective means for congressmen to highlight their differences
with an unpopular president.
Once the presidential campaign of 1896 got under way, the Cuban war faded into
the back pages of the newspapers. The two major candidates, Republican William
McKinley and Democrat (and Populist) William Jennings Bryan, came out in support of
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the Cubans, so there was little mention of the topic on the campaign trail.57 However,
the Republican, Democrat and Populist platforms all included planks expressing
sympathy with the Cubans and called for their independence. The Republican platform
plank concerning Cuba, which would become the topic of much debate in the year to
come, called for an end to Spanish oppression and concluded with; “…we believe that
the Government of the United States should actively use its influence and good offices
to restore peace and give independence to the island.”58 Constructed with ambiguous
language, the Republican plank on Cuba was designed to be sympathetic yet
noncommittal. Democrats would later interpret the wording differently and accuse the
Republicans of abandoning their pledge to “liberate” the Cubans.
Although all political parties played lip service to the cause of the Cuban rebels,
the prominent issue in the 1896 presidential campaign was whether the monetary
standard in America would be based on gold or a combination of gold and silver
(bimetallism). McKinley’s campaign lobbied big business and major banks to finance
his campaign.59 Using the threat of bimetallism to frighten Eastern businessmen who
championed the gold standard, McKinley collected a record three and a half million
dollars for his campaign.60 Bryan, who was nominated by both the Democratic and
Populist parties, attracted widespread support among Southern and Western voters and
helped unite the fractured Democratic base. In the end though, big money led to a
McKinley victory. In spite of the Republicans taking the top spot, Democrats did
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manage substantial gains in both the House and Senate but fell short of the majority in
both. The Democratic strategy of distancing themselves from Cleveland was only a
partial success.
With the election over, newspapers once again began devoting substantial space
to the Cuban insurgency. In the days preceding McKinley’s inauguration, a new round
of debates over the situation in Cuban was suddenly sparked by an event on the island.
Pro-independence Cuban General, Antonio Maceo, who had been portrayed in
congressional speeches as a courageous “George Washington” figure, was killed in a
battle on December 7, 1896. Through newspaper editorials, Maceo had become a
romantic figure to Americans who followed his heroic defiance against his Spanish
adversaries. When word of Maceo’s death reached America it was erroneously reported
that the Spaniards had treacherously murdered him during truce negotiations.61 This
fictitious report was probably manufactured by the Cuban Junta (See pages 22-23) but
was cited as fact by members of Congress. Consequently, demonstrations demanding the
liberation of Cuba were held in Boston, New York, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, Chicago,
Memphis, St. Louis and numerous other small towns across America.62 Congressmen
were also flooded with pro-Cuban petitions containing thousands of signatures from
their constituents. This public indignation that Congress had carefully nurtured for
political benefit was now becoming unmanageable.
On the day of General Maceo’s death, President Cleveland sent a message to
Congress that cautioned Congress against taking the United States down a dangerous
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path toward war. He also warned Congress against taking any action to recognize the
belligerency of the Cuban insurgents. He argued that according to the principles of
international law the circumstances that justify a neutral nation recognizing insurgent
belligerency had not been met in Cuba. Cleveland explained that before a revolting
community can be recognized they need to establish a functioning government. The
Cuban insurgents had failed in this regard, as Cleveland pointed out; “…at the demand
of the commander-in-chief of the insurgent army, the putative Cuban government has
now given up all attempt to exercise its functions, leaving that government confessedly
(what there is the best reason for supposing it always to have been in fact), a government
merely on paper”63
Ignoring Cleveland’s message, on December 21, 1896, Senator Cameron resubmitted his resolution calling for Cuban independence. This time it was submitted as
a joint resolution (binding) and required action from Cleveland. 64

The lawmakers’

plan was to pass the resolution overwhelmingly, send it to Cleveland, allow him to veto
it, and then override it into law. However, Secretary of State Richard Olney (directed by
Cleveland) held a press conference to address the resolution. Olney announced that
even if Congress passed the resolution over Cleveland’s veto it would not be acted upon.
He argued that the power to recognize a state rested exclusively with the executive
branch of government and furthermore if any resolution on the subject were passed it
would be “important only as advice of great weight, voluntarily tendered to the
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Executive, regarding the manner in which he shall exercise his Constitutional
functions.”65
Jingo congressmen were livid with Olney’s announcement and talk of
impeachment was heard in the following debates. New Hampshire Republican Senator
William E. Chandler fumed over Cleveland’s defiance of Congress; “It is worse than
that of Andrew Johnson. The only trouble is that if we were to pass it over the veto, and
Mr. Cleveland should refuse to execute the law, there would be no time to impeach him.
Thank God, however, we will not have him in the Executive Mansion after March the
Fourth.” 66 Following suit, Democratic Senator John T. Morgan accused Cleveland of
being a dictator; “If the president has the power to disregard a law enacted by Congress
over his veto, we have ceased to live in a land of laws and have found in our presidential
office a power that is not pretended to by any monarch that exists in the world.”67 Other
Senators chimed in with similar complaints but Cleveland had succeeded in changing
the issue to a debate over the constitutional powers of the executive and legislative
branches of government. The resolution on Cuba’s independence was in effect dead as
Congress retired for winter’s recess.
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Chapter Three
Cuba: A Political Football

In the closing weeks of Cleveland’s presidency public sentiment continued to be
aroused by fresh reports of American citizens being murdered, mistreated and
imprisoned in Cuba. William McKinley could only hope to have the problem solved
before he took the presidential oath. The incoming president was against sending
American men into armed conflict with Spain on humanitarian as well as economic
grounds. McKinley had served as a Union volunteer in the Civil War and had been
decorated for bravery under fire at the Battle of Antietam. This Civil War confrontation,
which would be the bloodiest single-day battle in the history of the United States, left a
deep impression on the young soldier.1
Apart from these reservations, McKinley was also strongly aligned with the
business community which believed a war would have a negative impact on the nation’s
economy. McKinley had been the darling of the business community since his days as
an Ohioan congressman in the House of Representatives. In this position, the future
president had authored the pro-business “McKinley Tariff” of 1890 which protected
domestic industries by increasing the tariff on foreign products.2 Business leaders
returned the favor in 1891 by backing McKinley in his successful campaign for
governor of Ohio. One of his supporters, Ohio millionaire-businessman Marcus Hanna,

1

James M. McPherson, To the Best of My Ability (London, U.K.: DK Publishing Inc, 2004),
396.
2
Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1959),44-47.

36

would become McKinley’s most trusted friend and political advisor.3 In 1893 when
McKinley went bankrupt and creditors seized his property, it was Hanna along with
other businessmen such as Andrew Carnegie and Henry C. Frick who bailed the
governor out of debt.4
In the 1896 presidential race the business community once again rallied in
support of McKinley. Among others, America’s economic triumvirate of the Gilded
Age; J.P Morgan, John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie rewarded the Republican
candidate with handsome donations.5 These three powerful tycoons, as well as most of
the business community openly expressed to McKinley their aversion to war with
Spain.6 Industrialists believed a foreign war would severely disrupt business as usual.
Businessmen preferred the growing domestic market over foreign outlets; but when they
did trade overseas, the lions’ share (92.5 percent) went to Europe or European
Dominions.7 A war with a European power (even though Spain accounted for only a
small part of U.S. trade with Europe) could prove disastrous for this trade.8
McKinley would have to confront the Cuban crisis from the very beginning of
his presidency. The trouble in Cuba had already taken a heavy toll on American
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businesses and farmers that owned property on the island. The Spanish-American Light
Company, which represented a consolidation of five gas and electric companies in Cuba,
reported in December of 1896 that the war had halted all revenues from Havana and
interest payments to bondholders would have to be suspended.9 American sugar and
tobacco plantation owners suffered an even worse fate as they helplessly watched Cuban
rebels torch thousands of acres of crops as part of their “slash and burn’ policy of
defeating the Spanish army. Among President McKinley’s backers, John D. Rockefeller
had probably lost the most in the Cuban crisis. The oil baron owned a multi-million
dollar iron mine near Santiago Cuba but due to the prolonged warfare all production had
to be halted.10 Against this background, business leaders generally believed that the
Spanish government was better equipped to protect American property and ensure a
return to the status quo in Cuba. In this regards, McKinley concurred.
In the days before entering the White House, McKinley busied himself with
carefully choosing pro-business men to fill his cabinet. Hanna was considered for
Secretary of the Treasury but the Ohio businessman made it clear he preferred a seat in
the Senate. Bowing to this desire, McKinley appointed Ohio Senator, John Sherman to
Secretary of State in order to create a vacancy for Hanna to fill. The Ohio legislature
took this cue from McKinley and promptly elected Hanna to fill the remainder of
Sherman’s term as Ohio Senator. This blatant act of political cronyism caused much
consternation among McKinley’s opponents and provided an endless source of mockery
of the new administration. Newspapers portrayed Hanna as a puppet master with
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McKinley dangling at the end of the strings.11 Democrats in Congress jokingly called
the president “McHanna,” and referred to the president’s policies as “Hannaism.”12 One
Senator scornfully asked “If McKinley should die, would Hanna still be President?”13
McKinley, who had a good sense of humor, took this criticism in stride. He had been a
Washington insider for almost twenty-five years and knew how the game of politics was
played.
After taking office, the newly-elected president made clear his intentions of
keeping the United States out of a war with Spain. In his inaugural address, McKinley,
like so many presidents before him, reiterated the isolationist theme of Washington’
farewell address; “We have cherished the policy of non-intervention with affairs of
foreign governments wisely inaugurated by Washington, keeping ourselves free from
entanglements, either as allies or foes, content to leave undisturbed with them the
settlement of their own domestic concerns…War should never be engaged upon until
every agency of peace has failed…” 14
To implement this policy, McKinley surrounded himself with like-minded
congressional leaders; most of whom were wealthy businessmen. In addition to
Hanna, other influential members of this “Millionaire’s Club,” would be Senator
Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island and Senator Stephen B. Elkins of West Virginia.
McKinley’s vice president, Garret Hobart of New Jersey was also a prominent
industrialist and had been hand-picked by Hanna to serve the pro-business
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administration.15 In the House of Representatives, Speaker Thomas B. Reed
(ridiculed by Democrats as “Czar Reed”) would become McKinley’s most loyal
supporter. These Republican leaders exerted pressure on the rest of their party to
abandon all talk of war with Spain. This new agenda was adopted by the
Republican ranks and afterwards there was a dramatic change in the congressional
proceedings. Republican congressmen, who once delivered long eloquent
speeches on the necessity of intervening in Cuba became conspicuously silent.
Even the most vocal expansionists in congress such as Henry Cabot Lodge and
William P. Frye softened their rhetoric and became more willing to pursue
peace.16 The Republican leadership in both houses of Congress also blocked
resolutions or debates concerning the Cuban issue. This Republican about-face
would become a major source of partisan bickering in the months ahead.
Congressional Democrats and Populists were opposed to the McKinley
Administration’s pursuit of peace with Spain from the beginning. These leaders were not
about to surrender the Cuban issue that had been so carefully nurtured for their own
political purposes. If Republicans insisted on non-intervention, they would be held to
account politically for betraying the Cubans for their own selfish reasons. Throughout
the long debate preceding the Spanish-American War the public was constantly
reminded of how the Republicans reversed their policy of supporting the Cuban
rebellion. “Before the election the Republican Party is Dr. Jekyll, and after the election

15
16

Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 83.
“Cuban Sentiment Moderating,” New York Times, 9 December 1896, p.1.

40

Mr. Hyde,” Nebraska Populist William L. Greene joked to members of the House.17
Arkansas Democratic Congressman Hugh Dinsmore similarly mocked the Republicans
for changing their position:

Where now is the clarion voice of my distinguished colleague on the committee,
the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Wm. Alden Smith), whose fervid, eloquent
appeals stirred the souls of us all? What has become of my other colleague, the
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Adams), who fairly fattened the Record with
reasons, in the last Congress, why we should recognize the belligerent rights of
Cuba… Will he tell us now that his argument was sophistry, his position
unsound? 18

The nation’s newspapers also noted the change in sentiment among the
Republican members of the Foreign Affairs Committee who were now backing away
from provoking Spain and blocking any forwarded resolutions to give the Cuban
insurgents belligerency status. In December of 1896, the New York Times reported;
“Members of that committee who at the last session were radical in their opposition to
Spain and bubbling over with enthusiasm for the Cuban patriots have changed front
since their return to Washington and are now among the most conservative men on the
committee.”19
Several Republicans defended their change in position by claiming that the
incoming McKinley Administration should not be confronted by such a serious
international dilemma upon entering the White House. They believed it important for
McKinley to evaluate the situation and formulate his own Cuban policy. Other
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Republicans declared that the time for the United States to intervene in Cuba had passed.
Arguing that American commerce on the island had all but been destroyed, a member of
the Foreign Affairs Committee assessed the situation, “If we had intervened a year
ago… American property rights in the island would have suffered only a partial
interference. Today, as I say, the island is bankrupt, and its trade will be worth nothing
to the United States for twenty years.”20
Throughout the rest of 1897 and into 1898 the Democrats and Populists became
ever more hawkish on the prospect of war with Spain. Their strategy was to paint the
worst possible portrait of the atrocities in Cuba and then blame the unsympathetic
Republicans for conspiring with the Spaniards and ignoring the will of the American
people. Republicans were accused of being hired traitors, cowards, unpatriotic and
mindless slaves to their master McKinley. One Democratic Congressman even ridiculed
Republicans for worshiping Benedict Arnold as their patron saint.21 With acerbic
hyperbole, Democrats blamed the Republicans for enabling the Spaniards to continue
the extermination of the Cubans unhindered. In some of the most vitriolic rhetoric, the
Spanish military’s actions in Cuba were declared to be “more fiendish and devilish than
have blackened the pages of history since the days of Caligula.”22 Another Congressman
declared that Cuba was worse than Dante’s “inner recess of hell.”23 These colorful
tirades were designed to antagonize the Republicans as well as provide titillating
episodes for the newspapers to cover.
20
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Democrats also criticized Republicans for being in the pocket of big business or
financiers. Democrats such as Congressman Cyrus A. Sulloway made outrageous claims
that the big European money interests controlled the Republican Party. Sulloway
contended that the House of Rothschild owned two-hundred million dollars in Cuban
bonds and should Cuba achieve her independence these bonds would depreciate in
value, hence; “Rothschild controls (J.P.) Morgan, Morgan controls Hanna and Hanna
controls McKinley, the Supreme Court, the Senate, and the House of Representatives.
Hanna is America and America is Hanna.”24 Democratic Congressman Hugh A.
Dinsmore likewise blamed Republicans’ allegiance to big business as the reason for
their unwillingness to intervene in Cuba; “True to your political obligations, you are
unanimous in your support of trusts, syndicates, and organized capital. You are still true
in your devotion to protecting the organized manufactures of this country.”25
Congressman Jerry Simpson, a Populist from Kansas, argued that both
Republicans and Democrats were controlled by business interests. Simpson claimed that
Cleveland had prevented a war with Spain because he and his administration were the
agents, “of the bond-holding interests of the country and the 400,000,000 of bonds that
Spain has issued to carry on the Cuban war … the Republican Party will follow in the
same line of action.”26
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In response to such attacks on Republicans, business leaders criticized the
Democrats and Populists in Congress for playing politics with the Cuban crisis. Writing
in the New York Times, businessman Abraham Miller accused Democrats and Populists
of trying to embroil the United States in a foreign war to unite the people around an
external issue. He specifically targeted the Populists for pushing for war because “A
foreign war would more surely than anything else enable them to compass their ends…
and quickly send us to a silver basis.”27
Convinced that exploiting the Cuban crisis was becoming a winning strategy,
Democrats such as New York Congressman William Sulzer compared the Cuban
insurgents’ struggle against Spain with the United States’ own war for independence.
To loud applause from the Democrats present in the House, he proclaimed that his party
was on the right side of history; “The Democrats in this House are in favor of passing a
joint resolution granting belligerent rights to the Cubans. The Republicans have
persistently refused to permit a vote on the question. The people of this country will
hold the Republican party responsible for that action at the coming election.”28
Republican Representative Robert Adams took the floor to question the patriotism of the
Democrats who were aggravating a foreign crisis to win seats in the House; “I look
hopefully forward to the day when our foreign policy will be national and permanent in
its character and not subject to party strife.”29
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Several Republicans conceded that ignoring the Cuban situation posed a grave
political danger in upcoming elections. Kentucky Republican Representative David G.
Colson cautioned his colleagues; “I say if we do not terminate this unholy warfare [in
Cuba] I expect to see the next House of Representatives have in it many faces that we do
not see here today…”30 Colson’s fellow Kentuckian, Democratic Congressman Albert
S. Berry agreed that Republicans would be punished by the electorate if they failed to
liberate Cuba and openly bragged, “I think the Republicans are on the run… the
handwriting on the wall indicates that in the very next election they will find themselves
in the minority in this country.”31 Democrats present in Congress laughed and applauded
Berry’s braggadocio. In response to this taunting, Republican Congressman Henry U.
Johnson of Indiana warned the Democrats they were playing a dangerous game with
America’s foreign policy; “I wish it were possible that gentlemen could take a broader
view of this subject [the Cuban civil war] than merely to consider it as something upon
which they may hope to obtain a partisan advantage.”32 Later in the debate, Johnson
bolstered his criticism of Democratic demagoguery by reading an article from the
Washington Post that described the Democrats as “…a thoughtless and hot-headed
minority… that was creating a movement for war that was … clothed in the alluring
garb of altruism and paraded as a noble effort of benevolence. But its moaning is war.
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Its only possible result is carnage, barbarism, disaster…[the] war cry is inspired more by
partisan ardor than by intelligent conviction.”33
This scathing article in the Washington Post had stated the obvious about
Democrats’ effort to wrap themselves in the American flag. It is important to consider
that these legislators, who were mainly from the South, demanded freedom for the AfroCubans, while they denied their own black neighbors basic civil and human rights. For
example, Alabama Democratic Senator John T. Morgan, a former Brigadier General in
the Confederate Army and self-proclaimed white separatist, led the Senate in its crusade
to liberate Cuba. While serving as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Morgan had cried crocodile tears for the oppressed Cubans and submitted
several resolutions granting belligerent rights to the insurgents. But concerning civil
rights in the United States, Morgan supported repealing the Fifteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution that prevented voting rights based on race.34
Similarly, South Carolina Democratic Senator, (“Pitchfork”) Benjamin Tillman,
who supported American intervention on behalf of the Cuban insurgency, was largely
responsible for his own state’s Jim Crow laws.35 As Tillman proudly proclaimed in
1900; "We have done our level best [to prevent blacks from voting]... we have scratched
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our heads to find out how we could eliminate the last one of them. We stuffed ballot
boxes. We shot them… We are not ashamed of it."36
Missouri Democratic Congressman David de Armond is another glaring example
of this hypocrisy. In his own pursuit of the job as Speaker of the House, De Armond
was one of the most outspoken supporters of a war with Spain. He was a demagogue
who bitterly attacked the Republicans for betraying the suffering Cuban people (See
page 52). His long tirades in Congress were filled with platitudes for the “noble” and
“courageous” Cuban people. But on the day Congress passed the war resolution against
Spain, he argued against giving rights to blacks in America on the basis they were
“almost too ignorant to eat, scarcely wise enough to breathe, mere existing human
machines.”37
Republican Congressman Charles Boutelle of Maine, assailed these incongruent
positions by pointing out that millions of black Americans were denied their “sacred
rights” while Democrats insist we “…dash across the Gulf of Mexico and establish and
maintain the independence and freedom of the insurgents in the island of Cuba.”38 The
black community was equally skeptical of Congressional sympathy for Cuban rebels.
Shortly after the war, a group of black citizens from Massachusetts wrote an open letter
to McKinley expressing their indignation over the inconsistencies in American policy.
This stinging indictment of both the Congress and McKinley questioned why the United
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States would go to war over humanitarian reasons in Cuba while maintaining a
“shameful silence,” on the violent conditions in the South.39
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Chapter Four
Run up to War

Even though the Democrats kept up a steady attack on Republicans and
McKinley, the President continued to work diligently for a peaceful settlement. First, he
sent former New York Republican Congressman Stewart L. Woodford to Madrid to
serve as his minister. Once in the Spanish capital, Woodford would become McKinley’s
intermediary with the government and the Queen Regent María Cristina.1 McKinley’s
instructions, as set forth in a letter from Secretary of State Sherman, were for Woodford
to establish friendly contacts with the Spanish authorities and negotiate a peaceful
settlement to the conflict whereby Cuba would be granted autonomy based on the
Canadian model. If the Spanish agreed, McKinley promised to likewise negotiate with
the Cuban insurgents to accept these terms.2 McKinley realized that Woodford’s
mission would be difficult considering the unyielding position the Conservative Spanish
Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo had taken on the Cuban insurgency from
the beginning.
But, as fate would have it, while en route to his new post, word reached
Woodford that Prime Minister Cánovas del Castillo had been assassinated.3 Shortly
afterwards, the Conservative government in Madrid collapsed and the Queen Regent
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appointed a new Liberal Cabinet with Práxedes Mateo Sagasta as Prime Minister.4
Making Woodford’s task easier, this new government was reform-minded and willing to
grant Cuba a system of autonomy much like McKinley had suggested. Beyond this, the
new leaders also ordered General Weyler removed from his position in Cuba and
replaced by a less repressive leader; General Ramon Blanco y Erenas. After his arrival
on the island, General Blanco instituted more humane policies toward the Cubans and
quickly began to reverse Weyler’s severe reconcentration policy.5
Through further negotiation Woodford was also able to secure the release of all
American prisoners still held on the island. In a sign of goodwill, Spain even initiated
talks on a new reciprocal trade agreement with the United States and Cuba. Taking
advantage of the new-found cooperation among the two nations, McKinley requested
that Spain allow the United States to ship food and medicine to the starving Cuban
citizens. After some heated debate among Spanish leaders, McKinley’s plan was finally
accepted and the Spanish officials even helped distribute the supplies.6 By the end of
1897, Spanish-American relations were, on all accounts, improving remarkably.
Through McKinley’s skills as a politician and the luck of an assassin’s bullet, war at last
seemed avoidable.
On December 6, 1897, McKinley submitted to Congress a report on the
diplomatic progress being made between Spain and the United States.7 Loyal
Republicans in congress such as Pennsylvania Congressman Robert Adams touted these
successes; “Within sixty days of the time that the Republican President took his seat, the
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doors of the dungeon of Cuba were flung open…Spain has responded to these friendly
demands of this government in every particular. Weyler was recalled…the
reconcentrados have been gradually returned to their homes.”8
Republicans also argued that since Spain was in the process of complying with
all of McKinley’s demands it would be imprudent for America to take a more belligerent
stance toward Cuba. Democrats, on the other hand, complained that McKinley could
not take any credit for the positive changes occurring in Cuba. They insisted that the
only reasons for a glimmer of hope on the island were the result of the assassination of
Prime Minister Cánovas del Castillo and Spain was growing worried that the Untied
States would soon take action in Cuba. Congressman Dinsmore bragged that it was
actually the Democratic Party’s leadership on the Cuban issue that had forced Spain to
the negotiating table; “They saw that every organized body in the United States almost
had expressed its sympathy for the Cuban patriots and demanded intervention on the
part of this Government.”9 The Democrats also argued that the Cubans themselves had
not been a party in the negotiations with Spain and would not fully accept the
conditions. Moreover, they derided McKinley for betraying the Cubans for a lucrative
trade deal with the Spaniards. In reality, the Democrats were correct that the reforms
would have limited success. The Cuban rebels publicly announced their rejection of
“autonomy” and vowed to continue the struggle for nothing short of total
independence.10
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This issue of reforms in Cuba was equally as divisive among the two major
Spanish political factions. Conservative members of the military in Havana were upset
by General Weyler’s recall and began staging riots. After several days of
demonstrations, they attacked and burned down a pro-Sagasta newspaper office.
Fearing that this escalation in violence threatened American citizens living in Havana,
McKinley accepted Cuba’s Council General Fitzhugh Lee’s recommendation and sent
the battleship USS Maine to Havana harbor.11 McKinley hoped that this show of force
would calm the situation in Havana and would also placate congressmen who were
demanding some action on the President’s part. This action, however, backfired when
Democrats decided to use this as another opportunity to ridicule the President.
Congressman de Armond sarcastically asked Congress; “Is she [the USS Maine] there to
vindicate our manhood, to protect American citizens, to proclaim what is in the hearts of
the brave people of this country- sympathy for the struggling Cubans and detestation and
horror over the outrages perpetrated upon them? Oh, no!... her visit is merely a
resumption of friendly relations… in token of American humility and Spanish
condescension!”12
Other Democrats expressed the belief that McKinley had a more nefarious
reason to send the USS Maine to Havana. In a long harangue against McKinley,
Democratic Congressman Robert W. Miers of Indiana claimed the battleship’s real
mission in Cuba was to prop up the weak Spanish government by assisting the Spanish
military in oppressing the rebels. Miers concluded his speech by accusing the
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Republicans of conspiring with America’s sworn enemy: “The Stars and Stripes are
waving above the walls of Morro Castle [in Havana] not as a promise of liberty for
Cuba, but as a refuge for Blanco and the other officers of the Spanish Court…Is this the
way the Republican party keeps its promises? While Nero fiddles Rome burns.”13
Despite the Democrats’ accusations of collusion with the enemy and the vitriolic
call for intervention in Cuba, McKinley was still optimistic about finding a peaceful
settlement. The President had good reason to believe his efforts for peace were finding a
receptive audience in the American public. George M. Cortelyou, McKinley’s secretary,
reported that in the months leading up to the war; “90 percent of the mail coming to the
White House had supported the President’s pacific course.”14
The majority of citizens who wrote McKinley did express their confidence in his
wise leadership in such a troublesome time. Civil War veterans complimented the
president in resisting the martial spirit that aroused those younger Americans who had
never experienced the horrors of war. Business leaders openly worried about the impact
a war would have on the flow of commerce. Ohio Banker and Former Speaker of the
House Joseph Warren Keifer cautioned McKinley; “The expense of such a war would be
beyond calculation…All business interests would be suddenly deranged.”15
Religious leaders and peace organizations also praised McKinley for his
determination in avoiding a conflict. The Universal Peace Union of Philadelphia
extended their best wishes to McKinley and invited him to speak in an upcoming
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meeting.16 Other letters to the White House spoke of the political motivations of those
behind the war movement. A “Mr. Dodger” warned McKinley that his political enemies
would use the situation in Cuba against him regardless of what action the president took;
“Those very people, who, for no just cause, would push our country into the unknown,
would, as soon as they felt the distress that war brings and see its cruelty, be the first to
denounce the Administration and everyone connected with the bringing on of the war.”17
The letters that opposed McKinley’s pacific stance usually argued for war on the
basis of humanitarian concerns and the nations’ honor. Although these letters were
respectful for the most part, several warned McKinley of disregarding those who desired
intervention in Cuba in favor of the business community. Charles Henderson of New
York City expressed his thoughts to the president; “I trust, as a humble citizen, that your
cabinet will turn a deaf ear to the representatives of the great banking syndicates and
corporations who are reported to be offering suggestions in regards to a settlement of the
Cuban question… the people of our great country will not allow it for a moment.”18
Sitting aside the Cuban question, McKinley spent the first month of 1898
attending to other matters of state. In January the president and Mrs. McKinley
filled their schedule with receptions and dinner parties; hosting a record number
of guests. 19 Late in the month, McKinley traveled to New York City to address
the National Association of Manufacturers at their third –annual convention.20
McKinley made no mention of the Cuban situation during his long oration but did
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assure the businessmen he was in “full accord” with their various domestic and
international goals.21
On February 1, President McKinley hosted a diner for foreign diplomats at
the White House. The event was an elaborate affair, attended by representatives
of thirty foreign nations and their wives along with other government officials.
Adhering to proper protocol, McKinley stood before the guests seated at the long
table and toasted international cooperation and peace among the nations of the
world. The Spanish Ambassador, Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, sat four chairs down
the table on McKinley’s right.22
If McKinley believed his efforts to avoid a war with Spain had been successful
two events in February of 1898 were about to shake his confidence. The first event
occurred on February 9, 1898, when a private letter written by Spanish Ambassador
Enrique Dupuy de Lôme to the Foreign Minister of Spain in Havana, Don Jose
Canelejas, was intercepted. In this letter, de Lôme caustically ridiculed McKinley and
Spanish-American relations. Stolen by a member of the Cuban Junta, the letter was
quickly translated into English and sent to the major newspapers for its propaganda
value. The insulting language in the letter criticized McKinley for being “weak” and a
“would-be politician.” Even more damaging, the letter described the proposed Cuban
autonomy as simply a means of diverting American attention from Spanish to Cuban
officials.23 While most newspapers waited to verify the authenticity, Hearst’s Journal
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printed it the following day with the headline, “The Worst Insult to the United States in
its History.”24
As could be expected, McKinley was upset at this affront to his character and
called a special Cabinet meeting to discuss his administration’s options in dealing with
this crisis. After a lengthy meeting, McKinley sent a message to Spain calling for the
recall of de Lôme and an apology. Spain quickly consented to his wishes, but the
damage had been done. The New York Times ran de Lôme’s letter on the front page the
next day and spoke of the outrage felt by many Americans and congressmen who were
offended by the slanderous attack on McKinley.25 It is important to note that
McKinley’s opponents in Congress had openly used many of the same or worse
criticisms against the President.
Only a week after this scandalous news triggered public indignation, an even
more devastating news story splashed across the nation’s headlines. On the night of
February 15, the USS Maine blew up in Havana Harbor killing two hundred and sixty
six sailors. The headlines in the majority of American newspapers were remarkably
restrained in their account of the events. Most did not mention the possibility of Spanish
involvement. The Wall Street Journal reported that “the Spanish army and navy officers
are rendering every assistance” to the Maine sailors.26 Pulitzer’s World commended
Spanish sailors who “worked like heroes to save the few struggling Maine men now
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recovering in Ambrosio Hospital.”27 Other newspapers likewise avoided leveling blame
at Spain and instead cited the probability of a coal bunker igniting the fire.28
The mood in Congress was initially sober and subdued as well. Bi-partisan
resolutions were offered in the Senate calling for an inquiry into the explosion. Debate
centered on who was responsible for directing the investigation and what role the
Committee on Naval Affairs played in setting the guidelines for the report. A cautious
McKinley reported to waiting reporters at the White House that the Maine explosion
was “probably an accident.” He then asked Americans for patience while an
investigation team would be sent to Havana to search the wreckage for the cause of the
explosion. 29
While the nation held its breath waiting for the results of the inquiry, another
event provoked public outcry for intervention in Cuba. On March 17, 1898, Republican
Senator Redfield Proctor from Vermont arrived in Washington with a long-awaited
report on conditions in Cuba. Proctor, a well-respected former Secretary of War and
successful businessman, had announced some weeks earlier that he was going to take an
extensive tour of Cuba to ascertain the true conditions of the people. Proctor’s factfinding mission was important to the public as well as lawmakers, because of his
credibility. The Senator had previously been against any American intervention, so it
was anticipated that his findings would be free of any biases that had plagued similar
reports.30 From the day Proctor landed, newspaper reporters followed his journey
around the island. American newspapers ran daily stories on Proctor’s visits to the
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homes of Spanish and American officials, refugee camps, military prisons, relief depots
and orphanages run by the Red Cross. Even though the media reported on the
conditions the Senator encountered, Proctor himself refrained from making any
observations until he could address the Senate. 31
After Proctor returned to Florida, he made his way back to Washington by train
refusing any comments to reporters. Upon his arrival on March 17, he proceeded
directly to Capitol Hill and interrupted the usual proceedings on the Senate floor. As
Proctor approached the podium, every Senator in Congress was present and attentively
waiting. In an authoritative and dispassionate manner, Proctor meticulously laid out the
hard facts on the horrendous conditions that existed on the island. He admitted that
when he left for his visit he did not believe the sensational news reports but was now
convinced they were correct or worse. In his description, Proctor spoke of thousands of
emaciated women and children dying of starvation and disease. The remaining
insurgents on the island, he said, were still stubbornly holding out for independence.
More importantly, he proclaimed the war to be a bloody stalemate that only outside
intervention could end. 32 Proctor’s account of the desperate situation in Cuba had a
profound effect on many who had heretofore resisted American intervention. Many in
the business and religious communities, which had consistently opposed war, were
finally persuaded by Proctor’s speech.33
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Soon after Proctor’s speech the old Senator shared a buggy ride to Capitol Hill
with fellow West Virginia Republican Senator Stephen B. Elkins. As a former Secretary
of War, Elkins was conversant in foreign policy issues. On the way, Elkins praised the
respected statesman on his speech and told him that he had “stirred the country as it
never has been stirred.” Elkins continued to praise Proctor’s speech as a powerful and
colorful presentation not unlike that of the commentaries of Julius Caesar and the
memoirs of Grant. But honest to his anti-war convictions, Elkins admitted to Proctor
that he felt the speech was mischievous and dangerous. Elkins told him that he had
“taken a great responsibility and done great harm.”34
A few days later the Navy’s report on the Maine explosion arrived. The Navy
investigators had decided that it was an external explosion that had caused the
destruction.35 Coming on the heels of Proctor’s report to Congress, the timing could not
have been worse. Many Americans immediately suspected the explosion was a
deliberate torpedo attack by the Spanish Navy. McKinley, knowing what the
ramifications of this report would be, met with members from all political parties and
asked them for patience while his administration continued to pursue a diplomatic
solution. Most in Congress, including Republicans who had supported McKinley from
the start, knew that war was now inevitable. Several Republicans met with McKinley to
warn him that their party would suffer a huge defeat in November if he did not act soon.
On April 1, the New York Times reported that 200 Republicans had defected from
McKinley and were now ready to vote for war. In the same article, House Speaker
Thomas Reed responded to a governor’s plea to dissuade the Republican defection; “He
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might as well ask me to stand out in the middle of a Kansas waste and dissuade a
cyclone.”36 Lacking options, McKinley finally agreed to draft a message that would ask
Congress for the authority to use the military and naval forces as might be necessary to
secure peace and a stable government in Cuba.
McKinley, however, delayed sending the message to Congress while he made
one last-ditch effort to solve the crisis diplomatically. First, through Spanish Minister
Stewart Woodford, McKinley urged the Spanish government to declare an armistice in
Cuba, promise the people “full self-government, with reasonable indemnity,” and accept
American arbitration.37 Secondly and clandestinely, McKinley sent word to the Vatican,
via Saint Paul, Minnesota Archbishop, John Ireland, that he was willing to have Pope
Leo XIII mediate an end to the crisis. To avoid public and congressional awareness and
condemnation of these negotiations, McKinley drafted Senator Stephen B. Elkins to
conduct negotiations with all parties. 38
Senator Elkins was well suited for this task. In becoming one of the most
successful businessmen in the country, Elkins had excelled in the art of compromise and
gentle (and not so gentle) arm twisting. He had brought these skills to the Senate where
he was known for his political prowess.39 In addition, Elkins was personally acquainted
with Archbishop Ireland, the Spanish Prime Minister Luis Polo de Barnabé, and
members of the Cuban Junta. The Archbishop was equally important in these
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negotiations because not only was he the Pope’s surrogate but according to Elkins, a
loyal Republican and “had more influence with the Administration than any other
church authority in the United States.”40
On the morning of April 3, Elkins arranged for a three-way meeting between
himself, Archbishop Ireland and Spanish Minister Polo at the Elkins’ residence in
Washington. After the usual exchange of courtesies, Elkins and Ireland began to
emphatically present the dilemma facing Spain. They warned Polo that Congress alone
now had the power to declare war on Spain and was poised to do so. The two men
explained that the only avenue left for Spain was to declare an immediate armistice in
Cuba. Polo balked at this suggestion and maintained that if his country took this course
of action it would be considered a concession to the insurgents and would sacrifice
Spain’s dignity. The debate continued back and forth until the three surrogates agreed to
propose a temporary armistice lasting six months. The Archbishop left Elkins’ house to
send a dispatch to the Pope while Polo sent word to his government on the terms of the
meeting.41
That afternoon Elkins visited the White House to inform McKinley of the
proposed armistice. The Senator also held discussions with Assistant Secretary of State
William Rufus Day.42 When Elkins returned home he received word from Ireland that
the Pope was pleased with the turn of events. The Pope also explained that he had
telegraphed directly to the Queen Regent to encourage her influence to support the
proposed armistice. Archbishop Ireland also told Elkins that he had discussed the
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situation with French Ambassador Jules Cambon. The Ambassador promised Ireland he
would have an “earnest” talk with the Spanish Minister about granting an armistice and
also send a letter to the French government requesting they bring all possible pressure to
bear on Spain. Elkins reported this progress to a “good-spirited” McKinley and his
cabinet in a secret meeting. McKinley also wished to relay this information to the
Cuban Junta to ascertain if they would agree to these measures. Acting as a go-between,
Elkins promised the President he would meet with the Cuban Junta the following day.43
But that night around midnight a message from the White House was sent to
Elkins asking him to come see the President immediately. The President had received a
message from Minister Stewart Woodford in Madrid suggesting that Spain was seriously
considering granting an armistice with the condition that the United States withdraw
their fleet from Key West, Florida. McKinley was adamantly opposed to any suggestion
of removing the navy from Cuban waters. He knew that it would be political suicide if
he made such an enormous concession to Spain as Congress would pounce on any sign
of weakness. Word was sent back to Woodford that the United States’ Navy would have
to remain in Key West.44
The next morning, as promised, Elkins meet with an American Cuban Junta
spokesman, Col. John J. McCook. Elkins bluntly told McCook that he appreciated the
Cuban cause but it was impossible for the rebels to win Cuban recognition through war.
Elkins explained that if war was declared on Spain the United States would insist on
taking Cuba and Puerto Rico as a war indemnity. The only way for the rebels to achieve
Cuban recognition, Elkins continued, was for the Spanish and Cuban rebels to agree to
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an armistice and then work for recognition through peaceful channels. McCook did not
agree with Elkins but said he would discuss the matter with other representatives of the
Junta.45
On April 5, Elkins received word that his three-way negotiations with
Archbishop Ireland and Spanish Minister Polo may have bore some fruit. The Pope had
cabled the Archbishop a copy of a dispatch he received from the Queen Regent in which
she signaled a willingness to cooperate with the Pontificate. In the message, the Queen
Regent told the Pope she had “confided the honor of the Armies of Spain into his hands”
and “would consent to an armistice.” Elkins and the Archbishop understood this to mean
the Spanish Crown was willing to let the Vatican negotiate a peaceful deal but Elkins
needed official confirmation through the Spanish Minister. Elkins realized the Spanish
government may hold a different opinion than the Queen Regent and the deal to grant an
armistice may come with untenable conditions.46
Waiting for word from Madrid, Elkins went to the Senate to make the case to his
fellow Senators why it was important to avoid granting recognition of Cuban
independence. He explained to his colleagues that the Cubans had not earned their
independence and if the United States was forced to go to war on account of the rebels
America should keep Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines to help pay war costs.
Thereupon, he met with President McKinley and told him that members of the Senate
were coming around to this idea. Later in the day, Elkins met once again with the Junta
representative McCook and warned him that time was running out. Elkins reiterated the
need for the rebels to accept an armistice and failing that, the United States would annex
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Cuba and the island would be “lost to the insurgents forever.” McCook reacted angrily
to this threat and called McKinley “almost cruel” for wanting to deny the struggling
people of Cuba their liberty.47
For several days after, Elkins traveled back and forth between the White House,
the Archbishop’s residence, the Spanish Minister’s office and the Senate trying to broker
a peaceful conclusion to the Cuban crisis. On April 7, McKinley told Elkins that the
Spanish cabinet was fighting among themselves and that the proposed armistice had
been scrapped. Elkins then conferred with Archbishop Ireland on Spain’s stubbornness
and the decision was made to turn up the pressure on the Spanish Minister. The
Archbishop visited Minister Polo later that day and gave him the most unadorned threat
yet delivered. Ireland warned Polo that if his government failed to seek peace the
United States would not only take Spain’s honor they would also take Cuba, Puerto
Rico, the Philippines and bombard Barcelona. And after this humiliation; “…the Jewish
bondholders would simply devour Spain.” In taking his leave from Polo, the
Archbishop promised that if the Spanish failed to give the Cubans an armistice Spain
would cease to be a nation.48
The situation in Madrid was likewise becoming more agitated. The Pope had
renewed his pressure on the Spanish government to suspend hostilities in Cuba and the
Spanish Cabinet hotly debated what action to take. During one closed session of
discussion, the American Minister, Woodford grew impatient and interrupted the
meeting with a message that criticized the Spanish Cabinet members for delaying and
asked them to make a final decision within six hours. This unpardonable act of
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indiscretion on the part of Woodford sent the Spanish government into a fury. They
issued a condemnation of Woodford’s action and brought all deliberations to a sudden
halt. Elkins noted in his journal that; “it was too bad war might turn upon so
insignificant a thing.”49
During these final negotiations, Congress was becoming increasingly impatient
for action. Several Democrats declared that it was now the sole responsibility of
Congress to declare war and President McKinley’s position was irrelevant.50
Republican voices were also now heard loudly among the war cries. In a letter to the
president, Henry Cabot Lodge described the growing martial spirit among his
constituency and grimly predicted “if the war in Cuba drags on through the summer with
nothing done we should go down in the greatest defeat ever known before the cry ‘Why
have you not settled the Cuban question?’”51
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Chapter Five
Decision for War

Without any measure of success on the diplomatic front and faced with the threat
of Congress taking the initiative on the Cuban issue, McKinley finally submitted his
Declaration of War to Congress on April 11, 1898. This lengthy and legalistic document
requested the authority to use the military to bring hostilities in Cuba to a close but did
not exclude a peaceful resolution if possible. Conciliatory in tone, McKinley’s message
began by describing the intolerable conditions that existed in Cuba and addressed the
adverse effects the ongoing hostilities were causing to American trade and investors. He
spoke of the aroused emotions of the American people and legislators that interfered
with his administration’s advancement of domestic concerns. He meticulously listed the
numerous diplomatic attempts that were made to solve the crisis peacefully.1
The war message also extended sympathy to the Cuban people but asserted that
they would not be given a recognition of independence. The president considered
recognition of Cuban independence as unnecessary for American intervention and
unwarranted under international law. He also warned that recognition of any particular
government in Cuba might subject the United States to embarrassing conditions of
international obligation and “In case of intervention our conduct would be subject to the
approval or disapproval of such government. We would be required to submit to its
direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally.” McKinley feared that
if sovereignty were granted, American forces in Cuba would come under the jurisdiction
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of the rebel commanders and the United States would lose the ability to demand
reparations for damaged American property and investments that had occurred during
the war. Instead, American forces would intervene only as a neutral power in order to
terminate hostilities between Spain and the people of Cuba and allow for the
establishment of a new government. 2
McKinley’s war message handed the responsibility of further action against
Spain over to the legislative body; “The issue is now with Congress…I have exhausted
every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors… I await
your action.” In conclusion, McKinley offered one last bit of hope that peace could be
achieved without military intervention. He reported that the day before he had finally
received information that the Queen Regent of Spain had ordered General Blanco to
suspend all hostilities on the island. He recommended that Congress give this royal
decree solemn consideration in their deliberations and added; “If this measure attains a
successful result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving people will be
realized.”3
Initial reactions to McKinley’s message were, as to be expected, mostly divided
among party lines. The majority of Republicans embraced the message as a thoughtfully
constructed statement that demonstrated the president’s statesmanship. “I consider it a
strong and patriotic utterance, fully covering the whole question and justifying the
confidence of the people of the United States everywhere have in the executive,”
declared Iowa Republican Senator Jonathan Dolliver. Continuing, he suggested that
members of Congress should accept McKinley’s recommendations. In concurrence,

2
3

Ibid.
Ibid.

67

Senator Elkins told reporters that McKinley had made the case admirably and assured
them that the people of America and Congress would indeed sustain the message.
Illinois Republican member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Shelby M. Cullom,
agreed with Elkins that the President’s words would carry great influence but suggested
that the Senate may go further than he had recommended.4
Leaders of the opposition parties were unimpressed with McKinley’s message
and responded angrily. Their primary criticism centered around the president’s failure
to declare Cuba’s independence or call for immediate armed intervention on behalf of
the Cubans. Moreover, they derided the message as intentionally confusing and offering
more problems than solutions.5 Missouri Democrat Congressman Alex M. Dockery
ridiculed the message as anemic and “suggestive only of vague, uncertain, and hesitating
policies.” South Carolina Democrat Benjamin Tillman called it “illogical and
inadequate.” Kansas Populist Congressman Jerry Simpson claimed that the message
was “weak and vacillating” and a reflection of the man who gave it. He also declared
that McKinley’s proposal was humiliating and would go down in history as having
deprived America of her manhood and love of freedom. 6
Representatives of the Cuban Junta were equally disappointed in the President’s
message. Official spokesmen for the organization refused to openly discuss the matter,
but off the record expressed disgust with the implications of the message. Unidentified
Junta members vented to reporters that the McKinley administration had walked into a
diplomatic trap set by the Spaniards. The Junta members reasoned that since Spain had
agreed to a suspension of hostilities, McKinley would be restrained from taking any
4
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military action against them. However, since McKinley’s message had called for
forcible intervention to constrain both sides in the conflict, the American guns would
now be aimed at the insurgents. McKinley had effectively aligned the United States
with Spain and the Cubans would continue their fight for independence regardless of
who the enemy was. The Junta also warned that if indeed the American military took
action against the Cubans, it would be the “death knell” for the McKinley administration
and the Republican Party.7 Evidently, the Junta believed the majority of Americans
were sympathetic to the Cuban cause and if McKinley waged war on the rebels, the
American electorate would hold the president and his party responsible in the next
election.
Across the Atlantic, Spain had a very different interpretation of McKinley’s war
message. Sagasta’s government considered the message an insult to Spain’s dignity and
issued an official statement that repudiated the United States’ claim to have legal
authority to intervene in Spanish territory. The Madrid periodical El Correo argued that
Washington’s “lamentations over Cuban misfortunes” were hypocritical since the
American people and members of government were responsible for supporting the
rebels and thus prolonging the war. The Conservative Party organ, El Epoca assailed
McKinley for ignoring Spanish sacrifices made in agreeing to a cease fire. El lleraldo
de Madrid went even further in their condemnation of McKinley, announcing that the
message had revealed that the United States was the true enemy and “the author of the
war, who has taken advantage of the honesty of Spanish diplomats…” The paper went
on to declare that all diplomatic avenues were now closed and predicted that America
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would pay dearly for its blunder.8 Another Madrid paper, El Imparcial urged the people
to unite and demand the navy be sent immediately to Cuban waters. Spanish citizens
crowded the streets in patriotic demonstrations in Barcelona and Valencia shouting;
“Long Live Spain!” Long live the army!” Long live Cuba!” 9 On April 13, Spanish
Minister Woodford telegraphed Secretary Sherman that American citizens were coming
into various consulates seeking transportation out of the country and asked for
instructions on how to deal with them.10
If McKinley had hoped his message would bring Spain and Cuba to the
negotiating table he was mistaken. The threat of military action against the Spanish
military and non-recognition of the insurgents only succeeded in inflaming the situation.
The Sagasta government and the Queen Regent understood that the Spanish public
would not tolerate additional humiliating concessions. A military defeat at the hand of
the United States would be more honorable and politically viable than either losing to
Cuban rebels or sheepishly accepting America’s terms. The Cubans, for their part, were
as recalcitrant as ever in their demand for complete independence; too much blood had
been shed to settle for less. Besides, McKinley’s message still had to go through
Congress before the official policy on Cuba was formalized and the insurgents had many
allies in Washington.
It is also possible that McKinley had intentionally loaded his message with
ambiguous language in order to set off a long drawn-out debate in Congress. With
Congressmen engaged in political warfare over the details of the message, McKinley’s
administration could have some breathing room to solve the crisis peacefully. Spanish
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Minister Woodford floated the idea of a Cuban plebiscite and American diplomats began
putting a proposal together but time was running out. Both Woodford and the Secretary
of the Navy, John D. Long expressed their belief that with more time McKinley could
have broke the impasse without bloodshed.11
However, in all likelihood the President knew that war was now unavoidable and
hoped that calling for war would unite a divided country and lessen partisan bickering.
McKinley was also relieved to finally pass the burden onto Congress. The last months
had been agonizing for McKinley. He had suffered public ridicule through personal
letters, opinion columns and cartoons lampooning him as weak and a coward. In
demonstrations, rowdy crowds had even burned his likeness in effigy.12 Some in the
business community still urged him to resist war but the list of his supporters was daily
growing shorter. Those around him commented on the dark mood that enveloped the
president and noticed the “haggard” look on his aging face. During a musical program
being held in the White House in late March, McKinley had retired to a back room
where he sat on a sofa and burst into tears. In an unusually candid conversation,
McKinley confessed to journalist H.H. Kohlsaat that the constant political attacks were
causing him sleepless nights and physical strain.13 On the day the message was
delivered to Congress, an exhausted McKinley enjoyed his first evening of genuine

11

John L Offner, An Unwanted War (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press,
1992), 190.
12
Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines. (New York, N.Y.:
Random House, 1989), 96.
13
Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1959), pp.
181-182., Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines. (New York, N.Y.:
Random House, 1989), 98.

71

relaxation in weeks surrounded by several personal friends who kept their conversation
“purely social.”14
In Congress, McKinley’s message was acted on quickly. On April 13, the
Republican-chaired Foreign Affairs Committee brought to the full House a joint
resolution that closely adhered to McKinley’s recommendations. The resolution
authorized the President to use the military in Cuba but did not preclude non-military
intervention. It also did not recognize either a Cuban Republic or independence for the
Cuban people. But before the resolution could be read an argument erupted over the
time allotted for debating the measure. The President’s supporters in the House feared
this final round of debates would provide the opposition with the opportunity to deliver
lengthy harangues against McKinley and the Republicans. So accordingly, they limited
the debate to forty minutes. Democrats bristled over this parliamentary maneuver and
interrupted the proceedings to press for an extension of the debate. Texas Democrat
Joseph Bailey arose in protest and requested that a Democratic substitute resolution be
read. This minority resolution was similar to the one proposed except it recognized the
“Republic of Cuba” and demanded the president to immediately send the United States’
military to remove Spanish forces. Speaker of the House Reed denied the motion amid
boisterous cries of protests from the Democrats. Excited by the rowdy Democrats
cheering him on, Bailey loudly exclaimed; “The Chair is trying to force the minority..,”
before his voice was drowned out by Speaker Reed’s gavel and shouts of “regular
order!”15
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This was the final straw for the frustrated Democrats. They rose en masse to
demand their voices be heard. James Richardson of Tennessee shouted “They [the
Republicans] are simply playing for political advantage and the people of the country
ought to know it!” The Republicans responded in kind and the opposing parties began
shouting remonstrations at each other across the aisle. The verbal jousting soon turned
violent when a Republican, Charles Brumm accused Democrat Franklin Bartlett of being
a liar. The latter picked up a large bound copy of the Congressional Record and hurled
it at his accuser. The two antagonists lunged at each other and chaos ensued. Members
of each side collided in the middle of the room as they struggled to hold back the
combatants. Women seated in the galleries screamed as innocent bystanders scrambled
to escape the melee. A government employee caught in the middle of the confusion was
knocked down from a blow to his jaw. Banging his gavel, Speaker Reed ordered the
Sergeant of Arms, to restore order. Fearing for their safety, the House Rules Committee
retired for a special meeting to reconsider the parameters of the debate: thus ended the
first attempt to pass a resolution on the president’s message.16 Faced with the most
critical question confronting the American people since the Civil War, congressmen
resorted to slinging insults and fists to resolve their differences.
The House Rules Committee returned minutes later and each side was allowed to
offer their resolutions and debate their positions. Debate on the resolutions was on par
with the many preceding confrontations in Congress over the Cuban situation.
Republicans defended their position of pursuing every possibility of peace before war
was declared. Cuban recognition was argued against on legal grounds and the
Democratic Party was chastised for exploiting a national crisis to score political points.
16
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Speaking for the other side, the leading Democratic member of the Foreign Affairs
Committee, Hugh A. Dinsmore commented in a reflective tone that he regretted the
manifestation of partisanship that had occurred earlier. “If there was ever a period in the
history of this government when patriotic dignity should have been shown and
partisanship should have been subordinated to statesmanship that period is now,” he
declared before a prolonged round of applause. Having prefaced his speech with praise
for bi-partisanship, Dinsmore proceeded to blame the hesitating policies of the majority
party for the death of the sailors on board the USS Maine. Speeches by other Democrats
in the House continued the narrative that McKinley and his supporters were responsible
for the tragedy in Havana harbor and the continued suffering of innocent Cubans.
The acting chairman of the committee, Republican Robert Adams closed the
debate by calling for unity among all members of the House regardless of party
affiliation. He touted the Republican-sponsored resolution as sufficient to ensure
America’s Christian duty toward the Cubans and maintain the nation’s honor. In
conclusion he appealed to the House; “that one and all rise in their places and cast their
votes to show the world… that however we differ on matters of detail, we are Americans
one and all, and that politics cease at the seacoast.” The minority resolution was voted
on first and defeated by 191 nays to 148 yeas. The majority resolution was then offered
and despite the many voices that had ridiculed it earlier it easily passed by 325 yeas to
19 nays, with 12 members not voting.17
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In the Senate, the deliberations on McKinley’s message were less dramatic if no
less partisan.18 The debate in the upper chamber lasted four days with thirty Senators
speaking on several resolutions. In the end, the resolution they passed by a 51 to 37
margin, was similar to the House version except it included the Turpie-Foraker
Amendment that recognized the “Republic of Cuba” and the Teller Amendment that
disclaimed any American imperialist design on Cuba.19 Although most Republicans
opposed the bill because of these two amendments, eleven of them defected to the other
side. The House initially rejected the Senate resolution outright as well, but through a
compromise the Turpie-Foraker Amendment was dropped and the Teller amendment
adopted.
Shortly afterward the resolution was signed by McKinley, an ultimatum that
required Spain to vacate Cuba was hand carried by Secretary of State Day to the Spanish
Ambassador. With war unavoidable, McKinley’s administration favored taking swift
and decisive actions against Spain. Previously instructed by McKinley, war planners
from the Naval Academy had completed a contingency plan which included attacking
the Spanish navy in the Caribbean as well as in the Pacific. Like Cuba, the Philippine
islands were also engaged in an insurrection against the Spanish and American
intervention would be needed to end the hostilities. On April 21, McKinley ordered a
blockade of all Cuban ports and on April 24, Commodore George Dewey, commander

18
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of the Asiatic squadron, was ordered to proceed to the Philippines to destroy the Spanish
fleet.20
The prospect of war was an exciting enterprise for the American nation. Treated
as a sort of coming of age party, thousands of men and women, from nearly every
section and demographic of the United States, clamored to offer their services for the
war effort. Newspapers reported that Southerners were ready to stand shoulder to
shoulder with their former Northern foes in defense of their now-united country. Recent
immigrants to America, likewise, declared their eagerness to prove their loyalty to their
new home on the battlefield.21 Similarly patriotic, 10,000 African-Americans
volunteered and were formed into all-black units.22 Even, Annie Oakley, of Buffalo
Bill’s Wild West Show fame, wrote McKinley a letter offering to form a company of fifty
women sharpshooters to fight Spain.23
Many politicians were anxious to join the action as well. Theodore Roosevelt
resigned from his post as Assistant Secretary of the Navy and formed his own regiment,
the “Rough Riders.”24 Not to be outdone, William Jennings Bryan organized his own
regiment of Nebraskan volunteers and headed for Florida to wait for transportation to
Cuba.25 In an effort to heal Civil War wounds, President McKinley appointed several
ex-Confederate officers to lead the United States’ Army. One of these newly-appointed
20
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Generals was the sixty-one year old Alabama Congressman Joseph Wheeler.26
Obviously, the McKinley administration maintained a tight control over who was
allowed to participate in the war. McKinley, the perennial politician, understood well
the danger of offering his political enemies the chance to win hero status in a war: Bryan
spent the war on the coast of Florida commanding a makeshift army camp.
The war itself was a quick lopsided victory for the United States. The first battle
of the war took place in Manila Bay, where Commodore Dewey’s fleet defeated a
Spanish squadron in a matter of hours (Apparently, word of this action was the first time
many in Congress had heard of the Navy’s intention of conducting operations in the
Pacific) .27 In the Caribbean theatre of war, the American forces had similar successes.
Besides some stiff resistance by the Spanish in Cuba, and almost no resistance in Puerto
Rico, the war was over in 113 days.28 Afterwards, the United States had acquired an
extensive overseas empire. On December 10, 1898, representatives of the United States
and the Spanish government met to sign the Treaty of Paris, which required Spain to
finally relinquish sovereignty over Cuba. The treaty also ceded Puerto Rico, Guam and
(for $20 million dollars) the Philippines to the United States for guardianship.29
Although American members of the peace delegation agreed to the treaty,
ratification by a two-thirds margin in the U.S. Senate was required to bring the treaty
into law. Obtaining Democratic support for this treaty would prove a difficult task for
26

Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1959),
p.229.; With snow white hair and beard, Wheeler was noticeably thin and frail. While in the heat
of battle in Cuba, an excited and confused Wheeler was reported to have shouted to his men,
“We’ve got the damn Yankees on the run!”
27
It is noteworthy that during the long congressional debate leading up to the war with Spain, the
Philippines were rarely, if ever, mentioned.
28
Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1959), pp.
241-291.
29
Donald H. Dyal, Historical Dictionary of the Spanish American War (Westport, CT.:
Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 1996), 253-254.

77

the McKinley administration in the months ahead. McKinley believed that keeping the
islands would benefit both the United States and the native inhabitants. Concerning the
Philippines, McKinley sought the advice of John Forman, who was the leading Filipino
authority at the time. Forman warned that the Filipinos were divided along racial lines
and that if the country were abandoned it would descend into chaos and bloodshed.
McKinley also realized that other countries would likely intervene if America left.
Germany had already been negotiating with Spain to purchase the Philippines; in this
regard, on June 12, a German squadron under Admiral Otto von Diederichs had arrived
in Manila harbor.30
The debate in the Senate on ratification of the treaty also focused mainly on the
annexation of the Philippines. Despite the unifying, nationalistic event of victory in war,
partisan division remained intense. These heated exchanges among the Democrats and
Republicans revealed that the parties were as divided as ever. Democrats once again
argued against the treaty on racial grounds. Senator Tillman summed up their ideology
shortly after the vote in February of 1899, “…with five exceptions every man in this
Chamber who has had to deal with the colored race in this country voted against the
ratification of the treaty. It was not because we are Democrats, but because we
understand and realize what it is to have two races side by side that can not mix or
mingle without deterioration and injury to both and the ultimate destruction of the
civilization of the higher.”31 It is ironic that the Democratic congressmen who pushed
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the hardest for war with Spain now protested the loudest against the American
expansion that resulted.
All but two of the Republican Senators supported the treaty. Their stated
reasons for ratification varied. Some declared it was now America’s responsibility to
bring democracy and education to these suppressed people. Others discussed the
economic benefits of an overseas empire for the United States and the islands’
inhabitants. Others argued that America’s reputation as a world power was at stake. The
two Republican Senators who voted against the treaty, George Hoar and Eugene Hale,
argued that this form of imperialism was against American principles. Hoar warned his
colleagues in the Senate, “This Treaty will make us a vulgar, commonplace empire,
controlling subject races and vassal states, in which one class must forever rule and
other classes must forever obey.”32
As the vote on the treaty approached, McKinley’s Republican allies in the Senate
worked overtime buttonholing Democrat members and making cloakroom deals for their
vote. Nonetheless, a preliminary headcount revealed that the treaty was still four or five
votes short of ratification. McKinley, however, found support from an unlikely source.
Democratic leader William Jennings Bryan visited the capitol shortly before the vote
and urged his supporters to vote for the treaty. In Bryan’s truly Machiavellian scheme,
he planned on using anti-imperialism as a campaign issue in the next presidential
election.33 The treaty was approved on February 6, 1899 by a vote of 57 to 27; only one
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vote more than the two-thirds majority required.34 Once again, politics had played a
crucial role in shaping America’s foreign policy.
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Conclusion

In the final analysis, the road to the “splendid little war” of 1898 was paved with
politics. Beginning with an unpopular Cleveland presidency and an unprecedented
economic crisis, congressmen found it advantageous to redirect the voter’s anger toward
Spanish atrocities in Cuba. Once McKinley came into office, and persuaded the jingoes
in his own party to abandon the war cry, the Cuban issue became bitterly partisan. In
this poisoned environment, there was no chance for an honest debate on the issue.
Exagerated rhetoric by irresponsible politicians forced the United States ever closer to
war and made any diplomatic solution impossible. President McKinley at first tried for
a negotiated end to the Cuban dispute. However, as the options for ending the dispute
peacefully proved ineffective, McKinley chose to declare war. The President thought a
declaration of war (and war itself) would curtail partisan division in Congress but that
did not prove to be the case.
All political parties had played a game of political expediency that accelerated
the U.S. entrance into global affairs and would set the stage for further conflicts in the
twentieth century. As unprecedented as this episode in American history was, it was not
to be an isolated incident. Throughout the twentieth century, American foreign policy
continued to be framed by partisan politics. From the First World War to the Cold War,
American politicians have exploited or even aggravated foreign dilemmas for partisan or
personal gain. The celebrated tradition of politics ending “at the water’s edge” is more
of a myth than reality. As America enters the twenty-first century and faces new
challenges from abroad, the political parties are as divided and indisposed to cooperation
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as ever. Hopefully in the future, American politicians can put aside their ambitions to
serve the best interests of the nation.
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